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Abstract 
A domestic monopolistic firm has the option to service a foreign market through export 
or by setting up a plant in the host country under exchange rate uncertainty. We analyze 
the effect of the parameters of the demand and cost functions on hysteresis. We also 
show results on the effect of taxation and labor cost in attracting or avoiding relocation. 
We find that when the firm is multinational it pays more taxes. Much more importantly, 
a tax rate reduction is effective in attracting investment and avoiding relocation. When 
the firm is multinational it also incurs lower labor costs. However, labor cost is not 
determinant in the location of production. 
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    The decision of where to locate the production of a tradable good is an investment 
decision made under uncertainty and is costly to reverse. An exporting firm has the 
option of setting up a plant in a host country at any time. In the same way, a 
multinational firm has the option at any time of abandoning the host country and 
serving it through exports. In any case, the firm finds it convenient to wait for better 
conditions. A firm facing this problem can be understood as having a financial option. 
Dixit (1989) developed a model for the decision whether to enter and exit a market 
based on financial option theory. The argument is simple: "an opportunity to make a 
real investment is a call option on a stock that consists of the capital in place". 
Accordingly, the option value of an investment project is evaluated to represent the 
value of waiting. The investment decision entails sunk costs, which can be understood 
as the strike price. 
    In this article we consider that the uncertainty comes from the exchange rate. 
Theoretical models such as Goldberg and Kolstad (1995), Sung and Lapan (2000) and 
Aray and Gardeazabal (2006) show that exchange rate movements influence the 
location decisions of firms. The empirical evidence available on the relationship 
between exchange rate fluctuations and FDI includes Blonigen (1997), who argues that 
the exchange rate may affect FDI because acquisitions involve firm-specific assets 
which can generate returns in domestic currency, and Campa (1993), who finds a 
negative effect of exchange rate volatility on the number of foreign firms entering the 
U.S. market. 
    In this paper we use the methodology of Dixit (1989) and Dixit and Pyndick (1994) 
as well as the model of Aray and Gardeazabal (2006) to study a monopolist's location 
decision in an uncertain environment. We analyze the effect of changes in the 
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parameters of the demand and cost functions, local and foreign taxation and the role of 
labor costs in deciding where to locate production. 
 
2 The model 
 
2.1 General Framework 
 
    Based on Dixit's model, Aray and Gardeazabal (2006) developed a model of the entry 
and exit decisions of a domestic oligopolistic firm competing à la Cournot with n 
foreign firms in a host country where all the firms have linear demand and cost 
functions. We follow their model to explain the case of a monopolist facing nonlinear 
demand and cost functions. 
   Assume that the exchange rate, S, changes over time as a Brownian motion, and hence 
all uncertainty arises from the exchange rate. 
(1)                                      dzdt
S
dS σµ +=  
    where dz is the increment of a standard Wiener process, normally distributed with 
zero mean and variance dt, µ is the trend rate of growth of the exchange rate or the 
deviation of the exchange rate from its equilibrium path at each point in time, and σ is a 
measure of its potential volatility. 
    According to the Dixit's model, the firm's decision problem is reduced to the problem 
of exercising an option. The approach has two state variables: the current exchange rate, 
S, and a discrete variable, j=0,1, that indicates whether the firm is an exporter (j=0) or a 
multinational (j=1). In state (S,0) the firm decides whether to produce only in the 
domestic market and to export or to begin to produce (and sell) in the foreign market, 
which means exercising the option of going multinational. In state (S,1) it decides to 
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continue producing (and selling) in the host county or to go domestic again, which 
means exercising the option of being an exporter.  
    The current profit of a firm in state j as a function of the exchange rate is πj(S) and the 
expected discounted value of the firm given an initial exchange rate S and state j can be 
expressed as Vj(S). 
    A firm facing such a problem and able to change flexibly from one state to another 
has to price both options simultaneously. Under non-arbitrage opportunities the 
following must be satisfied 




j ρπ =+  
where ρ is a discount rate and E is the expectation operator. By Ito's Lemma, we have 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )SSVSVSSVS jjjj πρµσ −=−′+′′222
1  
    The general solution of (3) can be written as 















































    It can be considered that exporting is profitable when the domestic currency is 
depreciated and setting up a plant abroad is profitable when the domestic currency is 
appreciated. This simple reasoning introduces the restrictions A1=B0=0. Eliminating the 
sub-index we write 
 
 5






    Let S ( S ) be the level of exchange rate low enough to induce the firm to invest in the 
host country, that is, the exchange rate at which the firm exercises the option to go 
multinational (abandon the host country). Thus, the firm retains its option to go 
multinational over the interval (S,∞). However, a multinational firm will continue 
operating in the host country over the interval (0, S ). Notice that S > S. 
    Let I and D be the sunk costs in foreign currency of undertaking the projects of going 
multinational and exporting respectively. The value matching and the smooth pasting 
conditions will be given by 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )












(5)                                                            
    The equations in (5) form a nonlinear system that has to be solved for A, B S, and S . 
2.2 The case of nonlinear demand and cost functions 
 
    Let the foreign currency market price be given by the following inverse nonlinear 
demand function 
(6)                                             01- , 0    with >>>= βαα βjj QP  
The total cost is assumed to be also nonlinear 
( ) (7)                                       1 , 0  with  +>>= βδγγ δ jjjjj jQQC  
    The firm solves the following problem whatever the state 
( ) ( )[ ][ ] (8)                                    11  max 11 jjjjjjj QQSSt δβ γατ −−− +−  
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where τ ∈[0,1]. Positive values of τ can be interpreted as iceberg-type transport costs 
rather than as an ad-valorem tariff because trade restriction are normally used to protect 
local producers from foreign competition, so in this case a tariff makes no sense. tj is a 
tax rate on profits. The solution of the maximization problem gives 






































    The profit as a function of S is given by 



















































    With the expected present value of the current profits being 
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3 Numerical Results 
3.1 Baseline case 
 
    Consider a set of baseline parameter values to attiain the numerical solution. Assume 
that α=5, β=-0.5, γ=δ=1, τ=t0=t1=0, σ=0.1, µ=0, ρ=0.025, and I=D=10. 
    Figure 1 shows the effect of changes in the parameters of the demand and cost 
functions on the trigger exchange rates (S, S ). The upper left panel shows the case of 
changes in α, which can be interpreted as changes in the market size. This is the case of 
an exogenous shift in demand that causes equilibrium prices and quantities to rise. S 
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rises and S falls as α increases, leading to a decrease in the degree of hysteresis. The 
higher price and quantity push operating profits up. Therefore, if the firm is exporting; 
going multinational would be profitable at a higher S. However, if the firm is 
multinational; to abandon the host country it will require a lower S  because the higher 
profits make exporting more profitable. However, it should be noticed that in small 
markets the trigger exchange rate is more sensitive, while in medium and large markets 
the trigger exchange rates hardly vary. 
    The upper right panel of Figure 1 shows that lower absolute values of β make 
hysteresis decrease. Notice that a lower absolute value of β implies in absolute value a 
higher price elasticity of the demand function, which is 1/β. A higher price elasticity 
increases operating profits, so we can apply reasoning similar to the case of market size. 
    The lower left and right panels of Figure 1 show the case for γ and δ. In both cases S 
( S ) decreases (increases) with higher values of these parameters, pushing the degree of 
hysteresis down. Notice that an increase in these parameters pushes operating profits 
down, so if the firm is exporting it will undertake the multinational project if the cost of 
investment is lower, which implies that the exchange rate would have to be lower. 
Similarly, if the firm is multinational it will require a higher exchange rate to stop 
producing in the host country and become an exporter. 
     
 






    We are interested in results that show the effect of tax policy on the decision of where 
to locate production. Tax reduction could be used as a tool for attracting or avoiding  
relocation of firms. 
    Figure 2 shows how the trigger exchange rate reacts to changes in taxation in both 
countries. The solid lines are the trigger exchange rates when the domestic tax rate 
varies from zero to five times the foreign tax rate. The dashed lines are the trigger 
exchange rates when the foreign tax rate varies from zero to five times the domestic tax 
rate. The results in both cases support the intuition. Consider the case of changes in the 
tax policy of the domestic economy. If the firm is exporting, a decrease in the domestic 
tax rate respect to the foreign tax rate will drive S down, so it can be interpreted as a 
way of deterring the firm from going multinational. Along the same lines, if the firm is 
multinational a reduction in the domestic tax rate will drive S  down, so the 
multinational firm will soon become an exporter, which can be interpreted as an 
incentive to attract the domestic firm to produce in its own country. A similar argument 
applies in the case of changes in foreign taxation relative to domestic taxation (dashed 
line). If the firm is exporting, a decrease in the foreign tax rate respect to the domestic 
tax rate will drive S up, so it can be interpreted as a way of attracting foreign direct 
investment, and if the firm is multinational the same policy will also drive S  up, which 
is a way of avoiding relocation. 
     
[INSERT FIGURE 2] 
  
    We also compute the total tax paid by the firm in state j. 
( ) ( )( )[ ] jjjkjj KSStST j −−= 11 τ  
    With the expected present value of taxes being 
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     Figure 3 shows the expected present value of tax payments in domestic 
currency by the firm in state j. The figure is drawn for t0=t1=0.1. It should be noticed 
that with an equal tax rate in the range (S, S ) if the firm is multinational it pays more 
taxes. It is also very striking that if the firm is exporting, the differences in tax payments 
are higher as long as S tends to S. Thus, if S reaches S the firm will go multinational 
even if the difference in tax payments is higher. Therefore, with an equal tax rate, tax 
payments are not determinant in the decision whether to relocate of production. 
     
[INSERT FIGURE 3] 
 
3.3 Labor costs 
 
    It is often argued that, in general, relocation of production is attracted by low labor 
cost. In this section we want to know whether in the case of exchange rate uncertainty a 
firm locates production to take advantage of low labor costs. Let wj be the wage rate in 
state j. As wj is not explicitly defined in our model, let us work on the cost function in 
order to obtain it. 
    Equation (7) could be generated by a Cobb-Douglas production function as 
 
( ) 0,   >== jjbjajjjj baLHLHfQ jj  
    where Lj are units of labor used in the production process and Hj are units of any 































































    where rj is the price of input Hj. 



































































































































    Finally the labor cost can be written as a function of the exchange rate 
( ) jjjj LwSSLC =  
    The expected present value is 
( )( ) dtetSLCE tj ρ−
∞
∫0  
    Figure 4 shows the expected present value of labor costs in both states. Notice that in 
the range (S, S ) if the firm is multinational it incurs lower labor costs. However, if the 
firm is exporting it bears higher costs. Notice also that cost differences are much higher 
as S moves away from S. It is also striking that when the firm switches from exporting 
to setting up a plant in the host country labor costs are similar, which means that in this 
case labor cost plays no role in attracting foreign direct investment. However, when a 
 11
multinational firm decides to become an exporter the changes in costs are larger. The 
explanation of this apparent contradiction is that the depreciation of the exchange rate 
can offset the higher labor costs, making exporting more profitable than being a 
multinational. In any case we can see that labor costs are not determinant in the decision 
where to locate production under exchange rate uncertainty. 
     




    We present a model of an international monopolist under exchange rate uncertainty. 
We consider that the firm has the option to locate production domestically and export to 
a foreign market or to locate production in the host country and serve it as a 
multinational. This decision is affected by changes in the parameters of the demand and 
cost functions. Tax reduction can be used as tool to attract and avoid relocation. Much 
more interestingly, with equal tax rates in the range of the exchange rate in which the 
firm could be multinational or an exporter, it would pay more taxes as a multinational. 
Our results on labor costs show that the firm would incur lower labor costs as a 
multinational. However, we have shown that labor costs are not determinant in the 
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Figure 4: Expected Present Value of Labor Costs in Domestic Currency. Solid line 
(j=0) and dashed line (j=1) 
 
 
 
 
